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Several unrelated factors have conspired to make intellectual humility a hot topic – or at 
least to make “intellectual humility” a buzzword – in contemporary epistemology.  First, 
testimony is a hot topic in contemporary epistemology, and there is something natural-
sounding about the idea that deferring to the testimony of another person is a 
manifestation of humility.  Second, the John Templeton Foundation has been generous 
in its support for research on intellectual humility (or at least for research that is 
articulated by using the expression “intellectual humility”), with the result that research 
on intellectual humility is relatively well-funded by contrast with research on many 
other epistemological topics (e.g. intellectual autonomy).  Third, we are at present 
regularly exposed by our media to vulgar and offensive instances of intellectual 
arrogance and immodesty – politicians and celebrities are the usual suspects – and it 
sounds natural to say that humility is an antidote to these vices.  Given these three 
factors, it is understandable why contemporary epistemologists are interested in 
intellectual humility.   
Here I shall argue that, just as there is a virtue of intellectual humility, there is a virtue 
of intellectual pride, or, alternatively, intellectual magnanimity.  How this is possible, 
given that humility and pride are (in some sense) opposites, will emerge below.  If I am 
right, we should not let the fashionableness of intellectual humility obscure the fact that 
there is a virtue of intellectual pride.  Indeed, an additional diagnosis of the appeal of 
intellectual humility will emerge: the virtue of intellectual humility is more important 
for those who are intellectually privileged, while the virtue intellectual pride is more 
important for those who are intellectually disadvantaged.   
1 The virtue of intellectual pride 
I assume an account of virtue on which virtues are excellences, such that the schematic 
form of a virtue is <excellence in jing>, which we can cash out with an Aristotelian 
formulation: excellence in jing is the character trait comprising the disposition to j at 
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the right time and in the right way.1,2  Thus every virtue (excellence in jing) is associated 
with a characteristic activity (jing).     
I assume an account of intellectual humility on which the virtue of intellectual humility 
is excellence in acknowledging your intellectual limitations.  The idea is that the virtue 
of humility is excellence in acknowledging your limitations, and the virtue of intellectual 
humility is just the virtue of humility as it applies to intellectual matters.  Under the 
heading of your “intellectual limitations” I mean such things as what you do not know or 
what you do not understand, your prejudices and biases, and your intellectual vices 
more broadly.  Thus manifestations of intellectual humility will include things like the 
acknowledgement of your ignorance about some question or the acknowledgement of 
your bias in some domain.   
The present account of intellectual humility is a variant on accounts that I offer 
elsewhere (2012, 2016a) and on an account offered by Dennis Whitcomb and his 
colleagues (forthcoming).  On their account, intellectual humility requires, in addition to 
excellence in acknowledging your intellectual limitations, excellence in “owning” your 
intellectual limitations.  Given their account of “owning” something (ibid.), this 
additional requirement is not implausible, although whether it is included will not make 
a difference here.   
However, I think there is an important reason to avoid the implication that the 
intellectually humble person will typically take responsibility for her intellectual 
limitations, if “taking responsibility” for something implies assuming oneself to have 
been causally responsible for it.  For we are too often not causally responsible for our 
intellectual limitations – these often owe much more to nature and nurture than to our 
own agency.  Consider someone whose ignorance of biology is down to the poor quality 
of the textbooks provided by their public school, or someone whose bias in favor of 
interpretations of events consistent with their prior self-conception is down to an innate 
disposition for such bias.  I want to say: the virtue of intellectual humility might be 
manifested by acknowledgement of these limitations, but it would not be manifested by 
“owning them,” in the sense of taking responsibility for them, because, the relevant 
person was not causally responsible for them.     
So much for the account of the virtue of intellectual humility.  My account of the virtue 
 
1 It seems to me that both excellence and individual excellences come in degrees.  Given 
the present assumption, this entails that both virtue and individual virtues come in 
degrees.  This seems right – people are more or less virtuous, more or less courageous, 
more or less openminded, and so on.  This as yet says nothing about the threshold for 
the attribution of virtue and for the attribution of individual virtues –  i.e. about how 
virtuous a person must be to count as "virtuous," about how courageous a person must 
be to count as "courageous," about how openminded a person must be to count as 
"openminded," and so on. 
2 Allow the variable letter “j” to range over anything that can be done, in the broadest 
sense of “done,” where this includes anything that can be denoted with a gerund, 
including e.g. believing.   
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of intellectual pride is modeled on this account, and premised on the idea that humility 
is to limitation as pride is to strength.  The virtue of intellectual pride, then, is 
excellence in acknowledging your intellectual strengths.3  The virtue of pride is 
excellence in acknowledging your strengths, and the virtue of intellectual pride is the 
virtue of pride as it applies to intellectual matters.4  Under the heading of “intellectual 
strengths” I mean such things as what you know or understand, your cognitive abilities 
and intellectual powers, and your intellectual virtues more broadly.5  Thus 
manifestations of intellectual pride will include things like the acknowledgement of your 
understanding of some issue or the acknowledgement of your expertise in some domain.   
Might pride also comprise excellence in acknowledging the intellectual strengths of 
others, such as your children or your colleagues, with whom you are connected in some 
relevant way?  I have no objection to this amendment; the trick will be in giving an 
account of the connection or connections that are “relevant.”  We should not say that 
intellectual pride is simply excellence in acknowledge intellectual strengths; it is those 
intellectual strengths that are associated with you, in some way that requires 
articulation, that are relevant here.  As well, we should take care to distinguish genuinely 
acknowledging someone else’s strengths and acknowledging your own strengths as they 
are manifested or evidenced in someone else’s strengths: this is the difference between 
being proud of someone else for some property of theirs and being proud of yourself for 
your role in bringing it about that they have that property.   
Whitcomb and his colleagues (forthcoming) use “proper pride” as the name for the 
virtue of pride.  I think this is unnecessary, and potentially misleading.  For all virtues 
are excellences in jing, and thus dispositions to j properly.  If we are talking about the 
virtue of pride, then there is no need to qualify it by calling it “proper.”  (Our temptation 
to call the virtue of pride “proper pride” derives, I think, from the fact that Christian 
ethics uses “pride” as the name for a sinful vice.) 
However, perhaps the word “pride” in the expression “proper pride” does not refer to 
the virtue of pride.  Perhaps it refers to pride’s characteristic activity: acknowledging 
your strengths.  There is such a thing as the proper acknowledgement of your strengths, 
but also such a thing as the improper acknowledgement of your strengths; only the 
former is associated with the virtue of pride.  But this is no reason to use “proper pride” 
 
3 Cf. Whitcomb et al. forthcoming, §5.2.   
4 There is a sense in which all pride and humility, as understood here, are intellectual, 
since they essentially involve acknowledgement, which is, in some sense, an intellectual 
matter.  Compare e.g. generosity, which essentially involves something practical, 
namely, giving or helping.  (For a more practical conception of pride and humility, 
consider Alan Wilson’s (2016) account of modesty.)  The “intellectual” in “intellectual 
pride,” in the sense that I am employing here, refers to what we might call the content of 
a particular kind of pride, namely, pride about intellectual matters.   
5 To quality as enjoying an intellectual strength, you need not be exceptional or satisfy 
some particularly demanding standard – a “strength,” in the present sense, is any 
positive intellectual property, as determined by salient norms, including a property we 
might describe in context as merely “adequate” or “satisfactory.” 
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as the name for that virtue, for the same applies to all the virtues.  Just as there is such a 
thing as the proper acknowledgement of your limitations, there is also such a thing as 
the improper acknowledgement of your limitations; but this does not mean we should 
use “proper humility” as the name of the virtue of humility.  The same, mutatis 
mutandis, when it comes to other putative virtues, such as courage, honesty, and self-
reliance.   
 “Pride” is thus ambiguous; indeed, it is multiply ambiguous, for “pride” is most 
commonly used to refer neither to the virtue of pride nor to its characteristic activity, 
but to an emotional attitude – exemplified by e.g. self-satisfaction about some 
achievement of yours.  (The emotional attitude of pride can be proper and improper, 
which might explain the temptation to use “proper pride” as the name for the virtue of 
pride, but so too can other emotional attitudes that share a name with a putative virtue, 
e.g. humility, benevolence, hope, etc.)  Although there are obviously important 
connections between the virtue of pride and the emotional attitude of pride, I will not 
pursue discussion of those connections here.  But it is important to note that the virtue 
of pride is a character trait, and not an emotional attitude.   
My account does not imply that the intellectually proud person will typically take 
responsibility for their intellectual strengths.  It is sometimes argued that you can 
coherently be proud about something only if you were primarily causally responsible for 
it; it is thus argued that it is incoherent to be proud of your children for their 
achievements or proud to be of a particular nationality.  I think this is a mistake: there is 
nothing incoherent about being proud to be gay or being proud to be black, even though 
people are not primarily causally responsible for being gay or being black.  If we are 
offended by people who are proud of their children or proud to their nationality, we 
need to look elsewhere for an explanation of what is problematic about their pride.  But 
this probably does not matter: my account of the virtue of intellectual pride does not 
entail anything about the emotional attitude of pride, e.g. that you can coherently be 
proud of your intellectual strengths even when you were not primarily causally 
responsible for them. 
We can now see how it is possible that there is a virtue of intellectual humility and a 
virtue of intellectual pride, even though pride and humility are (in some sense) 
opposites.  The sense in which pride and humility are opposites is that their 
characteristic activities – acknowledging your limitations and acknowledging your 
strengths – are (in some sense) opposites.  But there is no incoherence is supposing that 
both are virtues, i.e. excellences.  Nor would there be any difficultly in someone’s 
enjoying both of these character traits.  Compare excellence in gift giving, which we 
might call the virtue of generosity, and excellence in gift-receiving, which we might call 
the virtue of gratitude.  Indeed, whenever we can make sense of jing as having an 
opposite, ying, excellence in jing with have an “opposite virtue,” excellence in ying.   
I say that there is a virtue of pride.  Do I deny that pride is vicious or sinful?  It seems to 
me that what people mean when they say that pride is vicious or sinful probably does 
not contradict what I mean when I say that there is a virtue of pride.  All I mean when I 
say that is that there is such a thing as excellence in acknowledging your strengths.  
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Those who say that pride is vicious or sinful probably do not deny that.  Their use of 
“pride” does not pick out the virtue of pride, surely, because it would be absurd to claim 
that a virtue was vicious or sinful.   
It may be useful here to note that the names of virtues are typically ambiguous, having 
two distinct uses.  Consider “courage.”  You might use “courage” as a virtue term, such 
that it means (roughly) excellence in exposing yourself to personal risk.  “Courage,” in 
this sense, is synonymous with “the virtue of courage.”  And in this sense, it is a trivial 
conceptual truth that courage is a virtue, and so attributions of courage are essentially 
evaluative (prescriptive, normative).  Alternatively, you might use “courage” as a trait 
term, such that it means (roughly) a disposition to expose yourself to personal risk.  In 
this sense, that courage is a virtue is a substantial and controversial claim, and 
attributions of courage are not essentially evaluative (descriptive, non-normative).  So 
while no one would deny that courage is a virtue, when “courage” is used as a virtue 
term, it would be perfectly sensible to deny that courage is a virtue, when “courage” is 
used as a trait term.  And, in general, we need trait terms to coherently articulate 
evaluative questions about traits whose goodness or badness is controversial, e.g. 
chastity, modesty, and indeed humility and pride.  In any event, perhaps the claim that 
pride is vicious or sinful is best understood as using “pride” as a trait term.   
There is another possibility.  I say that intellectual pride is excellence in acknowledging 
your intellectual strengths, but you might think that there is no such thing as excellence 
in acknowledging your intellectual strengths, in the following sense: there is no right 
time or right way to acknowledge your intellectual strengths, since it is always wrong to 
do so.  That, you might think, is what it means to say that pride is vicious or sinful.  
“Excellence in acknowledging your intellectual strengths,” on the present proposal, is 
like “excellence in torturing people for fun.”  In an awkward sense, there is such an 
excellence, namely, being disposed to never torture for fun under any circumstances.  
But in a more natural sense, there is no such excellence.  And, so the argument goes, 
there is likewise no such excellence as “excellence in acknowledging your intellectual 
strengths.”  This is a serious challenge, and I aim to meet it in the next section (§2) by 
defending the utility of acknowledging your intellectual strengths. 
It is worth noting here that pride is sometimes also known as magnanimity; consider 
Hume’s illuminating discussion of “greatness of mind,” i.e. magnanimity or 
megalopsukia, which he treats as synonymous with “pride.”6  This sense of 
“magnanimity” is older and, I think, relatively unfamiliar in contemporary English; we 
would not now say that magnanimity is the opposite of humility, for example.  But if the 
idea of a virtue of intellectual pride is too hard to stomach, you may substitute 
“intellectual magnanimity” for “intellectual pride.”   
2 The utility of acknowledging your intellectual strengths 
There are two reasons to be dissatisfied with the account presented so far (§1).   
 
6 Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part iii, Section 2.   
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First, to say that there is a virtue of X is, in one sense, trivial.  For to say that there is a 
virtue of X is just to say of some j that there is such a thing as excellence in jing, and 
there is a sense in which that is true for any j whatsoever. 
I think what our discussion so far as missed is something like a presupposition of the 
claim that there is a virtue of X, i.e. that there is such a thing as excellence in jing (for 
the relevant j), namely, that excellence in jing is useful for creatures like us.  If the 
claim that there is a virtue of X presupposes that excellence in jing (for the relevant j) 
is useful for creatures like us, then the claim is non-trivial – and if it cannot be shown 
that excellence in jing is useful for creatures like us, then we should not say that there is 
a virtue of X – even if there is, in some trivial sense.   
Let’s say that X is a genuine virtue only if excellence in jing (for the relevant j) is useful 
for creatures like us.  One way of thinking about which excellences are useful for 
creatures like us is to think of every genuine virtue as corresponding to a distinctive 
human problem – some problem that human beings normally encounter in their lives – 
or to a distinctive set of human problems, i.e. a sphere or domain of human life, with 
which the virtue enables its possessor to cope.  This way of thinking about excellences is 
characteristic of Aristotle’s taxonomy of the virtues.  For example, in defense of the 
status of “seemliness” as a virtue, he writes: 
Since relaxation is a part of life, and one element of this is amusing 
diversion, here too it seems that there is a form of tasteful social conduct, 
namely, saying, and similarly listening to, the right thing in the right way. 
(Nicomachean Ethics 1128a; trans. R. Crisp) 
Excellence in saying and listening to amusing things is a genuine virtue, because 
relaxation is a part of life – and so humans normally encounter the problem of what to 
say and what to listen to in the context of relaxation, with which problem the virtue of 
seemliness enables its possessor to cope.  To put this another way, genuine virtues are 
those excellences that enable us to deal with the various aspects of the human 
condition.7  There are certain situations, activities, and temptations that are 
characteristic of human life; the genuine virtues are those excellences that enable us to 
get through those situations, perform well at those activities, and resist or overcome 
those temptations.   
Thus, our account of the virtue of intellectual pride (§1) seems incomplete, until we can 
show that intellectual pride enables its possessor to cope with some distinctive human 
problem, or to otherwise show that intellectual pride is useful for creatures like us.   
Second, you might think an account of some individual virtue would help us make some 
progress towards answering that fundamental philosophical question, “How should I 
 
7 Note that this is compatible with the idea that one aspect of the human condition is 
encountering other people who are themselves attempting to deal with the human 
condition, and thus with the idea that there are “other-directed” virtues, such as 
compassion.   
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live?”  But our account of the virtue of intellectual pride (§1) does not seem capable of 
providing any such help.  If we seek guidance or advice about how to live, the best our 
account has to offer would seem to be the injunction to be intellectually proud, in the 
sense of possessing or manifesting the virtue of intellectual pride, i.e. excellence in 
acknowledging your intellectual strengths.  But this could hardly guide someone in 
making a decision about what to do, think, or feel, whether in general or in some 
particular situation.  The advice “Be excellent” is like Larry Page and Sergey Brin’s 
preposterous motto “Don’t be evil,” the triviality of which underwrites Google’s 
amoralism.  Be excellent; do things at the right time and in the right way – these 
imperatives are platitudinous and without substance.  (There was a reason the Ten 
Commandments were more specific.)8 
Following Aristotle, it is sometimes useful to think of virtues as means between two 
vicious extremes, one a vice of excess and the other a vice of deficiency.  In the case of 
intellectual pride, we can situate the virtue of intellectual pride as a mean between a vice 
of excess disposing a person to improper over-acknowledgement of her intellectual 
strengths – which we could call intellectual arrogance – and a vice of deficiency 
disposing a person to improper under-acknowledgement of her intellectual strengths – 
which we could call intellectual timidity.9  But this “doctrine of the mean” does not 
provide practical guidance: knowing that the virtue of intellectual pride is the mean 
between the vice of intellectual arrogance and the vice of intellectual timidity does not 
tell us where that mean lies.   
Thus, our account of the virtue of intellectual pride (§1) seems incomplete, until we can 
provide something more by way of guidance for deciding what to do, think, and feel.  We 
want to know something, either in general or in particular cases, about the right time 
and the right way to acknowledge your intellectual strengths. 
These two problems, I submit, have a common solution.  To explain the distinctive 
human problem with which the virtue of intellectual pride enables its possessor to cope, 
it will suffice to explain when and how manifesting the virtue of intellectual pride is 
useful for human beings, i.e. to explain when and how acknowledging your intellectual 
strengths is useful for human beings.  (I assume, non-trivially, that individual virtues 
are useful because their manifestations are useful.)  But if we come to know when and 
how acknowledging your intellectual strengths is useful for creatures like us, we will at 
least make significant progress towards our goal of knowing the right time and the right 
way to acknowledge your intellectual strengths.   
Our task here is no different from the task facing the defender of any other virtue, e.g. 
intellectual humility.  The defender of the virtue of intellectual humility owes us an 
 
8 Granted, the injunction to be intellectual proud does have at least this much content: it 
implies that there is a right time and a right way to acknowledge your intellectual 
strengths.  The injunction might thus serve as a reminder of this point, as against the 
idea that e.g. acknowledging your strengths is always wrong.   
9 Intellectual arrogance and intellectual timidity are also naturally understood as the 
vices of deficiency and excess, respectively, corresponding to the virtue of intellectual 
humility (cf. Hazlett 2012, p. 220, Whitcomb et al. forthcoming, §5.2).   
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account of the distinctive human problem with which the virtue of intellectual humility 
enables its possessor to cope, along with insight into the right time and the right way to 
acknowledge your intellectual weaknesses.  And the same, mutatis mutandis, for 
defenders of other virtues.   
I shall argue that acknowledging your intellectual strengths is useful in at least three 
types of situations.   
First, consider learners in educational contexts.  Most teachers are familiar with 
students who are over-confident about their intellectual achievements and abilities, but 
most are equally familiar with students who are under-confident about their intellectual 
achievements and abilities.  Students sometimes do not know what they know, or that 
that what they know is relevant or significant, and they sometimes underestimate their 
capacities, or fail to recognize that their capacities are relevant or significant.   
In one kind of case, students suffer from we might call low intellectual self-esteem – a 
negative evaluative attitude towards their own intellectual achievements and abilities.  
Imagine a student, Kevin, who is inclined to drop his introductory-level American 
history course because, as he puts it, he “knows nothing about American history.”  He is 
basing this conclusion on the fact that he has struggled with the assigned readings for 
the course and that he got a bad grade on the first exam.  Actually, it turns out, he knows 
a fair bit about American history: he knew a thing or two coming into the course, and 
managed to get something out of the readings, despite finding them difficult.  Kevin’s 
negative experiences have caused him, in effect, to “forget” how much he knows about 
American history.10  Depending on the further details of the case, what may be needed 
here is for Kevin to acknowledge an intellectual strength of his, namely, his (admittedly 
limited and incomplete) knowledge of American history.  It is possible that Kevin can do 
well in and get a lot of out of the course, if he redoubles his efforts, but to get to that 
point, he needs to know that additional effort will be worthwhile, and to know that, he 
needs to know that he already knows quite a bit about American history. 
In another kind of case, students suffer from having an overly narrow conception of 
what is relevant or significant in a particular educational context.  Imagine a student, 
Seimone, who is assigned to write an essay for a sociology course on elitism in popular 
culture.  The suggested readings associated with the paper are dense, full of academic 
jargon that she does not understand, and employ mostly examples from film and 
television, with which she is relatively uninterested.  However, what she is forgetting is 
her years of experience working as a barista at the local Starbucks, which has provided 
her with observational knowledge of customers’ behavior and inside knowledge of how 
the company sells its products.  Starbucks is part of popular culture – she may not 
realize this – and her personal experience working there puts her in an ideal position to 
think and write an insightful essay about elitism in popular culture.  Unaware of this, 
however, she feels like she will be unable to do the assignment well.  Depending on the 
further details of the case, what may be needed here is for Seimone to acknowledge an 
intellectual strength of hers, namely, her experience working at Starbucks.  It is possible 
for Seimone to write a good essay for her sociology assignment, but to do that, she needs 
 
10 Cf. Radford 1966.   
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to choose her topic and approach well, but to do that, she needs to know the academic 
relevance of her non-academic work experience.   
Second, consider people who are intellectually marginalized in virtue of their 
membership of some intellectually marginalized group.  Intellectual marginalization” 
can include such things as lack of access to information or educational resources, 
stereotypes of inferior intelligence or of low intellectual potential, underrepresentation 
in public discourse, and lack of credibility.  One possible negative consequence of 
intellectual marginalization is a loss of confidence about your intellectual achievements 
and abilities.  Consider a case described by Jeremy Wanderer (2012, §II; cf. Jones 2002, 
Fricker 2007, Chapters 1 and 2): on account of implicit racial bias, a swimmer ignores a 
lifeguard’s warning that there are sharks in the water.  There are several ways in which 
“testimonial injustice” of this kind is problematic, including the insult or disrespect 
directed at the speaker and the exclusion of the speaker from public discourse, but my 
focus here will be on one particular kind of harm that can be done to the speaker in 
cases of testimonial injustice, namely, a loss of confidence about their intellectual 
achievements and abilities.  If you have told someone that p, their failure to believe that 
p can often be interpreted as evidence that you do not know whether p, and repeated 
ignorance or rejection of what you say can often be interpreted as evidence that you are 
unreliable.  It is easy to imagine a version of the lifeguard case in which he interprets the 
swimmer’s ignorance of his warning as evidence that he may have been wrong about 
whether there are sharks in the water.  (In Wanderer’s real-life version, there is no 
threat of this, as the swimmer is swiftly gobbled up by the sharks.)   
One reason it is easy to interpret someone’s ignorance or rejection of what you tell them 
as evidence that you may have been wrong has to do with the interpersonal nature of 
telling.  To tell someone that p is to invite them to believe that p on the basis of your 
having told them that p.  We are familiar with the extent to which accepting such an 
invitation involves trust and a commitment to or assumption of the trustworthiness of 
the speaker, but offering such an invitation involves something analogous: we tell things 
only to those whom we think competent to reasonably accept what we say.  As Wanderer 
(2012) notes, “The lifeguard’s testimony strives to rationally motivate acceptance of the 
claim made, to provide reasons which would both explain and justify the swimmer’s 
coming to form the belief.” (p. 151) This is one way in which telling is distinguished from 
mere saying.  We do not tell things to creatures incapable of understanding what we are 
saying, even if we sometimes do say things to them, and we do not tell things to people 
whose prejudice, bias, or obstinacy reveals their incompetence at evaluating what other 
people tell them, even if we do sometimes say things to them.  To tell someone 
something is to manifest some degree of intellectual respect for them.  This is why their 
not believing what you tell them is often plausibly interpreted as evidence against your 
intellectual achievements and abilities.  If you ignore or reject what I have told you, 
someone I thought competent to reasonably accept what I said has ignored or rejected 
what I said – and that is naturally taken as evidence that I do not know what I am 
talking about.   
However, whether the target of testimonial injustice loses their confidence about their 
intellectual achievements and abilities will depend on their antecedent disposition to 
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acknowledge their intellectual achievements and abilities.  It may be possible to avoid 
the harms described here by maintaining your confidence that e.g. you know what you 
are talking about.  We can imagine two versions of the lifeguard, depending on the 
whether he is disposed to doubt, on the basis of the fact that the swimmer ignored his 
warning, that there are sharks in the water.  Given the presence of racist swimmers on 
his beach, the more confident disposition has something going for it. 
Third, consider interlocutors who disagree.  You might think that acknowledging your 
intellectual strengths would be bad vis-à-vis engagement with disagreement, on the 
grounds that interlocutors can engage in civil and productive dialogue only when they 
acknowledge their intellectual limitations.  But that premise is consistent with the view 
that acknowledging your intellectual strengths can be good vis-à-vis engagement with 
disagreement.  Disagreement, especially disagreement with a rhetorically-skilled or 
masterful interlocutor, can put pressure on you – I mean psychological, rather than 
rational or evidential pressure – to abandon your position.  There are at least three 
kinds of situation in which such capitulation is problematic.   
Consider, first, cases of mutually recognized reasonable disagreement.  The possibility of 
such cases is controversial in contemporary epistemology; I have defended this 
possibility elsewhere, on the grounds that what it is reasonable for an individual to 
believe often depends on their inherited worldview, perspective, or frame of reference.11  
When Teodoro and Maribel contemplate the Lower Falls at Yellowstone, they respond 
differently: Teodoro, a devout Catholic, thinks that the majesty of the falls is a mark of 
their divine creation; Maribel, a committed humanist, thinks that it isn’t.   On my view, 
with relevant details filled in, both Teodoro and Maribel have reasonable beliefs about 
the falls, even after discussion and argument, and even after explaining the origins of 
their disagreement.  Because both of their beliefs are reasonable, neither should change 
their mind about the majesty of the falls.  But both may feel pressure to do so.  An 
obvious means of resisting such pressure is for each to recognize and bear in mind the 
reasonableness of their belief.     
Consider, second, cases of polarization or entrenchment, and in particular such cases in 
which a reasonable compromise position lies between two extreme positions, each of 
which has something going for it, which are adopted by the disagreeing parties.  
Consider an unrealistically simple and more-or-less schematic example: Senator Eslami 
proposes increasing the minimum wage to $15 per hour as a means of combatting 
income inequality; Senator Feng proposes decreasing the minimum wage to $5 per hour 
as a means of driving down unemployment.  Let’s assume that both have a point – a 
high minimum wage will narrow the gap between hourly employees and the wealthy, a 
low minimum wage will result in more hiring – and that the best policy lies in the 
middle: a $10 minimum wage.  If all goes well – a big “if” – debate will lead the two 
Senators to that compromise position.  What has any of this to do with 
acknowledgement of intellectual strengths?  It seems to me that both Senators need to 
keep in mind the fact that their position has something going for it, that it is motivated 
by considerations that ought to be taken into account.  Compromise requires both the 
 
11 Hazlett 2014.   
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willingness to moderate one’s position and the resolve not to capitulate.  If neither party 
will budge, then compromise is impossible, but if either party gives too much ground, 
the important insight of their position will be lost, and the reasonable compromise 
position will not be reached.   
Consider, finally, cases of collective inquiry based on the aggregation of independent 
inquiries on the part of the individual members of the group (or on the part of separate 
groups of individual members of the group).  Such cases range from the mundane – e.g. 
ensuring a correct arithmetic calculation by having several people do the calculation 
separately – to the significant – e.g. the classical liberal idea that a vigorous and earnest 
contest of opinions (to borrow a phrase that Mill used to make a related point) is the 
best way for a group of people to inquire about important moral, political, and social 
questions.  Collective inquiry of this kind requires independence on the part of 
individuals, premised on the idea that such independence will benefit the group 
overall.12  But independent individual inquiry requires a particular kind of engagement 
with disagreement, where there is disagreement between individual members of the 
relevant group.  In such circumstances, individuals cannot treat disagreement per se as 
a reason to abandon or amend their positions; to make their proper contribution to the 
collective inquiry, they must remain independent.  But this can be difficult, especially in 
those cases in which you are aware that you defend a minority position, as when you 
come to reject some orthodoxy or conventional wisdom.  Consider the position of the 
100 signatories of the Declaration of Sentiments at Seneca Falls in 1848, which asserted 
the moral, legal, and political equality of women and men, launched the women’s rights 
movement, and included the memorable observation that “the history of mankind is a 
history of repeated injuries and usurpation on the part of man toward woman.”13  
Among many other properties, one impressive feature of the Declaration of Sentiments 
is the extent to which its assertions were controversial, unpopular, unorthodox, and 
indeed offensive – the Oneida Whig (August 1st, 1848) called the Seneca Falls 
Convention “the most shocking and unnatural incident ever recorded in the history of 
womanity.”  Signing the Declaration of Sentiments took (I imagine) a fair amount 
courage and guts, and believing in what the Declaration of Sentiments said took (it 
seems to me) a great deal of confidence, just to believe something so much at odds with 
what nearly everyone else around you believed.  How then does this connect up with our 
issue of acknowledgement of intellectual strengths?  Consider the signatories of the 
Declaration of Sentiments as individuals engaged in the kind of collective inquiry 
described above.  Their confidence, we can easily imagine, was not merely a matter (if it 
was even a matter) of their degree of belief, of knowing that they were right, or of 
knowing that they knew that they were right, but a matter of knowing that they were 
capable of arriving at reasonable conclusions, that they had arrived at their conclusions 
sincerely and carefully, that their Declaration was a legitimate contestant in the liberal 
contest of opinions.   
I have argued so far that acknowledging your intellectual strengths is useful for people 
in (at least) three types of situation: for people in educational contexts, for people who 
 
12 See Hazlett 2016b.   
13 http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/docs/seneca.html  
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are intellectually marginalized, and for interlocutors who disagree.  In all three of these 
kinds of situations, the failure to acknowledge your intellectual strengths is problematic.   
This idea is further supported by the consideration of certain cases that are instances of 
all three of these types of situation – I have in mind the situations of intellectually 
marginalized college students who encounter the expression of offensive opinions by 
other members of their academic community.  On American university campuses, 
student protests targeting offensive speech have attracted relatively unusual media 
scrutiny in recent years, with many commentators lamenting the state of higher 
education and criticizing student protesters as “crybullies,”14 as “coddled” children15, or 
as representatives of a new “victimhood culture.”16  My aim here is to explain the utility, 
in these situations, of students acknowledging their intellectual strengths.   
Before proceeding, however, it’s worth noting that intellectually marginalized college 
students encounter and protest many things that are not instances of offensive opinion 
or speech – non-diverse faculties, for example.  My discussion here concerns students’ 
engagement with offensive disagreement – i.e. disagreement over offensive opinions – 
and not students’ engagement with other manifestations of institutional racism and 
sexism.   
What you think is or would be useful in the relevant cases of offensive disagreement will 
depend on what, if anything, you find problematic about them.  You might think that the 
only problem in the relevant cases is that the student protesters are wrong – wrong that 
Calhoun College ought to be renamed, for example.  This roughly “right wing” view, 
which jibes more or less with the criticisms mentioned above, would prefer it if the 
protests simply stopped and things returned to “normal.”  Alternatively, you might think 
that the only problem in the relevant cases is that university administrators have not 
agreed with the protesters – about renaming Calhoun College, for example.  This 
roughly “left wing” view sees institutional reform as the “solution” to the “problem.”  My 
argument here is premised on a different kind of worry, which has to do not with 
whether students’ views in the relevant cases are right or wrong, but with the form that 
their articulation of those views takes.  Here I think it is worth thinking about what, if 
anything, seems novel about the current climate of protest.  It is not that students 
disagree with their teachers and administrators, nor that they object to university 
policies, nor that they are easily and frequently offended.  It is rather something like 
this: in the relevant cases, rather than merely engaging critically with those with whom 
they disagree, students are demanding a kind of validation or endorsement from some 
third party.  Think, paradigmatically, of the demand that those guilty of offense be 
institutionally sanctioned in some way, e.g. that a professor expressing or manifesting in 
speech racist stereotypes be fired.  As a university teacher, it is the disposition to seek 
third-party confirmation that is most troubling about the relevant cases.  It is the idea 
 







that, when I say something wrong or foolish or offensive to my students, they might not 
jump at the chance to correct me, to argue with me, that they might not relish that 
opportunity to prove me wrong, but might prefer merely to object to others, perhaps to 
ask that I be censured in some way.  The appeal to a third party seems to replace the 
heart and soul of intellectual life – debate, dialogue, conversation – with a legalistic and 
bureaucratic proxy of intellectual life – the judgment of an impartial mediator.   
In any event, I want to say that this disposition to seek third-party confirmation, when it 
is present, can be mitigated by acknowledgement of your intellectual strengths. What 
may be missing in at least some of the relevant cases is a firm and sincere belief in your 
ability to participate in debate, dialogue, and conversation – or (for short) the ability to 
participate in intellectual life.  When you are confident of that ability, critically engaging 
with a disagreeing interlocutor is appealing than winning the endorsement of any third 
party.  In as much as such critical engagement is valuable, intellectual pride will be 
manifested by an acknowledgement of your ability to participate in intellectual life.   
This could just as well be put by saying that intellectual pride can ground or partially 
constitute intellectual self-trust or intellectual self-respect, understood as involving a 
positive evaluation of yourself as a thinker, an inquirer, and as a member of a 
community of thinkers and inquirers.17  Without a disposition to acknowledge your 
intellectual strengths, you can lose your sense of yourself as a capable thinker, a good 
inquirer, and a valuable member of your intellectual community. 
Is the ability to participate in intellectual life really an “intellectual strength”?  We 
should not deny this ability the status of an “intellectual strength” on the grounds that it 
is widespread or even universal among the members of some relevant population – 
achievements can be common, abilities can be ubiquitous, strength can be equally 
distributed.18  Nor should we deny this ability the status of an “intellectual strength” on 
the grounds that we are not typically responsible for possessing it (cf. §1) – an innate 
strength is a strength nonetheless.  Vicious timidity is sometimes manifested by a failure 
to acknowledge your relatively unexceptional intellectual powers; we often notice a 
symptom of this: someone who is overly deferential or intellectually subservient. 
I have suggested that intellectually marginalized students’ abilities to participate in 
intellectual life sometimes go unacknowledged, and that intellectual pride is a promising 
remedy for that problem.  But this should not be taken to mean that intellectually 
 
17 Cf. Foley 2001, Jones 2002, pp. 163-5.   
18 In some cases, however, an ability to participate does not deserve to be called a 
“strength” in the first place: consider a singing contest in which participants must 
simply pay an entry fee, even if they fail to make a sound; the ability to participate in 
such a contest is, at least, not a musical strength.  But intellectual life is unlike such a 
singing contest: mere participation is a kind of achievement, requiring active 
engagement, interpersonal interaction, mutual comprehension and understanding, etc.  
In this respect, intellectual life, if it is similar to a competition, is more like a competitive 
game: to even participate in a game of basketball (as opposed to, say, entering a 
basketball tournament) requires the exercise of both general athletic ability and skills 
specific to basketball.   
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marginalized students’ abilities to participate in intellectual life are not often 
undermined or rendered ineffectual by the institutions and practices that constitute 
their marginalization, nor that intellectually marginalized students’ intellectual abilities 
are often compromised, whether through neglect or through erosion, by the institutions 
and practices that constitute their marginalization.  Students’ acknowledgement of their 
intellectual strengths is not going to diminish their teachers’ implicit biases or their 
administrators’ unconscious employment of stereotypes.  My speculation is relatively 
modest: it is that intellectual pride can ground critical engagement with offensive 
disagreement.19  (And it’s worth mentioning that such critical engagement would mean a 
continuation, not an end, to the unrest seen in recent years.) 
That “pride” is sometimes understood as synonymous with “magnanimity” (cf. §1) is 
illuminating here. For we commonly think of the magnanimous person as calm, 
unperturbed, or level-headed.  The magnanimous person is not overly disturbed by 
insults, slights, harms, and wrongs again her – which is not to say that she is not 
disturbed by these things.  This picture of magnanimity has informed my sketch of the 
application of the concept of the virtue of intellectual pride to the case of engagement 
with offensive disagreement.   
 
Note well that the virtue of intellectual humility is not what is needed in these cases.  
What is needed is not an acknowledgement of limitations, but of strengths.  Indeed, 
there is a sense in which an excess of intellectual humility is part of what is problematic 
in these cases, if “intellectual humility” is understood as a trait term (§1) meaning 
(roughly) a disposition to downplay or de-emphasize your intellectual strengths.  
Intellectual humility, in that sense, is appropriate in some situations, but not, it seems to 
me, in the situation of intellectually marginalized college students.  And, in that context, 
the advice to “be humble” seems at least problematic, if not harmful.   
A final point in defense of the utility of acknowledging your intellectual strengths comes 
from a familiar phenomenon of political discourse: pretended intellectual humility.  I 
have in mind insincere implications of ignorance made for political purposes, such as 
the suggestion of so-called “climate change skeptics” that we do not yet know the causes 
of global warming, or Donald Trump’s call for a “total and complete shutdown of 
Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out 
what is going on.”  It is tempting to reply that, even if we are unsure what is causing 
global warming, we ought to play it safe and reduce our carbon emissions, or that, even 
if we do not know “what is going on” when it comes to Muslims seeking entry into the 
United States, a religious test for entry into the United States would be immoral.  But 
those concessions, it seems to me, are unnecessary and potentially dangerous.  A much 
better reply is that we know full well what is causing global warming – namely, carbon 
emissions -- and that we know full well “what is going on” when it comes to Muslims 
 
19 It is beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss other apparent conditions for 
successful critical engagement, including a reasonable confidence that interlocutors will 
hear your voice, take your opinions seriously, and not sanction you for expressing them 
– we could call this intellectual safety, which seems to require something like trust in or 
civic friendship with your interlocutors. 
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seeking entry into the United States – namely, nothing of consequence – and that the 
aforementioned implications of ignorance are utterly false.  But this is just to 
acknowledge what we know, i.e. one of our intellectual strengths.   
3 Intellectual pride and intellectual disadvantage 
I turn now to two objections, each of which suggests a disparity between intellectual 
humility and intellectual pride, which might undermine the idea that there is a virtue of 
intellectual pride “just as” there is a virtue of intellectual humility (§1).  This discussion 
will lead us to a diagnosis of the relative appeal of intellectual humility (by contrast with 
intellectual pride).    
First, you might object that human beings are more responsible for our limitations, 
including our intellectual limitations, than we are for our strengths, including our 
intellectual strengths.  Our strengths, so the argument might go, we owe to others – to 
our families, to our communities, to God – whereas our limitations are our own fault.  
Intellectual humility is therefore appropriate, but intellectual pride is not.   
I reply, first, that my account does not imply that we are as responsible for our strengths 
as for our limitations, since acknowledgement of your strengths does not imply causal 
responsibility for them (§1).  But I also reply, second, that we are not more responsible 
for our limitations than we are for our strengths.  In the case of intellectual strengths 
and limitations, we owe our intellectual limitations as much to others as we do our 
intellectual strengths.  I think the reason it seems otherwise is that we are implicitly 
adopting a perspective of intellectual privilege – we imagine someone raised in a safe 
and loving environment, provided with nutritious food, internet access, books, high-
quality education from an early age, time for study and reflection, etc., and it seems 
plausible that that person would be responsible for their intellectual limitations.  But 
imagine instead someone raised amid violence, separated from their family, hungry, 
without access to information, without access to education, etc., and that conclusion no 
longer seems plausible.  The apparent disparity between strength and limitation is not a 
necessary and absolute truth of human nature, but a contingent and relative truth of 
intellectual privilege.   
Second, you might object that human beings are naturally proud creatures, and not 
naturally humble creatures.  We are, you might argue, both naturally disposed to 
acknowledge our strengths, including our intellectual strengths, and naturally disposed 
not to acknowledge our limitations, including our intellectual limitations.  Given our 
human nature, the failure to acknowledge your intellectual limitations is more of a 
threat, more of a temptation, and thus more of a worry, than the failure to be proud.  In 
light of this, so the argument goes, there is more of an urgent need for the virtue of 
intellectual humility than there is for the virtue of intellectual pride.  
I reply, first, that the present objection wrongly focuses on vicious deficiency in 
acknowledge your intellectual limitations, at the expense of vicious express in 
acknowledging your intellectual strengths.  The virtue of intellectual humility is needed 
to avoid the former, but the virtue of intellectual pride is needed to avoid the latter (cf. 
§1).  But I also reply, second, that this apparent disparity between intellectual pride and 
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intellectual humility is, again, an artifact of implicitly adopting a perspective of 
intellectual privilege.  The disposition to acknowledge your intellectual strengths and to 
not acknowledge your limitations may be typical for those who are intellectually 
privileged, but the disposition to acknowledge your intellectual limitations and to not 
acknowledge your intellectual strengths is typical for those who are intellectually 
disadvantaged.  Humans are naturally proud – perhaps humans are naturally disposed 
to pride when exposed to conditions of privilege, but such exposure is not the state of 
humans per se.  As above, this all depends on what we imagine when we imagine “a 
human being.”  In academic epistemology I think there is a temptation to imagine 
someone relatively rich and well-educated, a reflective and intelligent person, perhaps a 
university professor.  Indeed, that person will be more tempted to not acknowledge 
their intellectual limitations than to not acknowledge their intellectual strengths.  But if 
we imagine not an intellectually privileged person but an intellectually disadvantaged 
person, that no longer seems clear.   
The implicit adoption of a perspective of privilege is what makes the critique of student 
protesters as coddled crybullies (§2) seem plausible at first glance.  The ability to 
critically engage with offensive disagreement is not an innate talent that only pernicious 
“coddling” could subvert, but rather an acquired skill, the development and exercise of 
which are conditioned by access to education, physical and financial security, 
acculturation and training, and (so I have been arguing here) a sense of intellectual self-
confidence.  Intellectual virtue is not the state of nature for human beings; it has to be 
acquired, taught, constructed, encouraged, and fostered.  Those who are lucky enough to 
enjoy a modicum of intellectual virtue should not begrudge those whom bad luck has 
left them with less.     
Recall a familiar charge made by social epistemologists against Descartes’ Meditations: 
when we begin by imagining ourselves alone, by the fire, we ensure epistemological 
reflections that downplay or ignore our intellectual reliance on other people.  My 
argument here has the same structure: when we begin by imagining an intellectually 
privileged person, we ensure epistemological reflections that downplay or ignore the 
situations and needs of the intellectually disadvantaged.  Against that imaginative 
background, it sounds right that intellectual humility is an important, perhaps a 
cardinal, virtue.  But if we change that starting point, imagining instead an intellectually 
disadvantaged person, intellectual pride emerges as a virtue that is (at least) equally 
important.   
4 Conclusion 
I have argued that, just as there is a virtue of intellectual humility, there is a virtue of 
intellectual pride (§1), defended the utility of acknowledging your intellectual strengths 
(§2), and sketched a diagnosis of the relative appeal of intellectual humility (by contrast 
with intellectual pride) (§3).20   
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